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Abstract: Although commonly misconstrued as a statement about the “correctness” of prices, the 
Efficient-Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a statement about their informational content. The aftermath 
of the recent recession has brought renewed skepticism to EMH, even leading some to redefine it as 
the inefficient market hypothesis. We demonstrate that such a change is misguided, as it changes the 
nature of the input (i.e., the market) but not the truth value of the statement (i.e., whether markets 
are efficient). We further outline several logical fallacies of the Hypothesis which negate its 
usefulness. We conclude by showing that the EMH was never a hypothesis and as such is best 
considered a conjecture. As a conjecture, it is increasingly difficult to reconcile with actual market 
behavior.  
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The Efficient Market Conjecture 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is approaching its fifty-year anniversary. During its 
lifespan it has undergone some fundamental changes since its original exposition in Fama (1965). 
Originally formulated as a response to predictive methods in technical market analysis, Fama laid a 
framework explaining why successive price changes were independent. Under this exposition, 
Fama continued a loosely Chicagoesque tradition of modeling price changes as random walks – 
mutually exclusive events unrelated to previous data points.2 Within five years, Fama defined more 
completely what the EMH implied as well as its causes (Fama 1970). The Hypothesis would 
become the now commonly accepted statement concerning the informational content of prices: “a 
market in which prices always 'fully reflect' available information is called efficient” (Fama 1970: 
383).  
 These two tenets taken together – the randomness of price movements and the completeness 
of the past information contained in them – have led adherents of EMH to advocate passive 
investment strategies. With future price changes randomly arising from as yet unknown 
information, investors would do better investing in a general market index rather than analyzing 
trends as efficient prices already embody the content and meaning of any relevant and available 
information.  
 Any relationship between information and price movements, although easily hinted at, is 
very hard to establish empirically. Indeed, to positively prove that stock prices, at every moment, 
“fully reflect” all available information is impossible, as even EMH proponents can attest (Fama 
1970: 384). A market that objectively prices subjective information would have to come into 
existence to allow measuring the speed in which this information would then be reflected into stock 
prices. Financial markets do not allow for this. In its place, economists had to search for something 
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 Although there were scattered attempts to demonstrate the randomness of future stock price changes throughout the 
20th century, Cootner (1962) is notable for bringing the theory academic rigor, thus making it palatable for financial 
economists to integrate into their own theories. 
to measure and turned to stock price movements themselves (in place of information flows).3 If no 
strategy could be devised ex ante that always leads to abnormal returns ex post, then this would 
imply that all information is fully priced and all price movement is random as no consistent 
abnormal returns could emerge from random movements but by chance. 
Thus, a hypothesis about whether prices fully reflect all available information turned into a 
discussion to determine if investors could follow strategies that allowed them to obtain ex ante 
abnormal returns. That EMH has become one of the most heavily scrutinized hypotheses in finance 
may give fuel to its detractors who claim it cannot explain simple prima facie counter-evidence – 
prolonged abnormal returns by certain investors (Warren Buffett, for example) or seasonal 
abnormalities such as the Monday or January effects. Yet it is not fair to say that the only reason 
empirical tests on the EHM were performed on investment strategies and their returns was the 
rivalry between technical and EMH advocates. That rivalry was not the reason but rather the 
motivation. The reason the Hypothesis has been so heavily scrutinized has little to do with its 
controversial conclusions, and rather because prices (and especially financial prices) are readily 
available to verify or negate the EMH (Ross 1987: 30). With the abundance of financial price data it 
is possible to test every single investment strategy one could conceive, both in and out of sample. 
All that remained from the information side was a frame on how efficient the market was 
depending on what sort of strategies would allow for abnormal returns. Fama (1970: 383) would do 
so by dividing market efficiency in three subsets. Weak, in which no abnormal returns could be 
found from historical prices, semi-strong in which no abnormal returns could be obtained from 
publicly available information and strong where not even private or “inside” information would 
give any investors an ex-ante advantage. 
 
The Assault on the EMH Fortress 
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 Incidentally, this bifurcation between price data and information data plagues much financial literature. Howden 
(forthcoming) analyzes  the efficacy of insider trading laws by way of looking for abnormal equity returns instead of 
tracing the flow of information being reassigned from one individual (or group) to another. 
 
In order to test the EMH, an underlying model of how individual stocks are expected to perform 
must be used. The Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) gave EMH advocates that opportunity, 
though the Hypothesis does not state that the CAPM is the required model to test it. In theory, any 
model that fits the existing data (and behaves solidly when tested out of sample) is sufficient, but 
the CAPM is generally used due to its shared or similar assumptions with the EMH, namely that all 
information is available simultaneously to all investors. Thus, the existence of a model that 
determined ex ante expected returns of investment strategies provided an opportunity for a new 
generation of economists to try to invalidate the EMH. The simplest approach was to find a 
mechanical investment strategy that would consistently obtain abnormal returns given the 
expectations of the CAPM. 
 The aftermath of financial crises, such as the 23% decline in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average on October 19, 1987, often led the popular press to proclaim the death of EMH. In its place 
a new cottage industry emerged to disprove its central tenets. Unfortunately, as with earlier attempts 
to empirically prove the existence of informationally efficient markets, many of these studies were 
plagued by narrow analyses of episodes selectively chosen to invalidate EMH (such as the 1988 
stock market decline). Echoing Ronald Coase’s famous dictum on torturing data, Burton Malkiel 
(2003: 72) criticized the opponents of EMH, stating that “given enough time and massaging of data 
series, it is possible to tease almost any pattern out of most data sets”. (As we will see, Malkiel fails 
to observe that the statement runs both ways.)  
 Extreme market volatility on its own is not sufficient to refute EMH. After all, “EMH does 
not imply that asset prices are always ‘correct.’ Prices are always wrong, but no one knows for sure 
if they are too high or too low” (Malkiel 2012: 75). The Hypothesis lays no claim to the correctness 
of prices, though it does imply that no arbitrage opportunity can exist in an efficient market, or if 
they do appear from time to time, they do not persist (Malkiel 2003:80). Still, if one were to view 
EMH as being a statement solely concerning informational inclusiveness but not about the 
“correctness” of the inclusion, it is tenuous whether the Hypothesis has any empirical relevance. As 
a purely logical statement it is easily refutable by relaxing the assumptions (and as we shall see, 
even without relaxing the assumptions the Hypothesis is problematic). As an empirical claim, 
without making a statement about the correctness of the information included in a price there is no 
way to test EMH (for example, by comparing market prices to those predicted by a pricing model 
such as the CAPM). 
Some investment strategies earning abnormal returns have proved durable, yet succumbed 
eventually to normalcy. Cochrane (1999), for example, assaulted EMH by way of the upward 
sloping yield curve. Bond returns were predictable to the extent that an upward sloping yield curve 
provided a profit-earning spread by borrowing short-term and lending long. Alternatively, foreign 
exchange returns were predictable as money invested in countries with higher yields could earn 
abnormal returns under periods of exchange rate stability; the now infamous carry trade found 
intellectual justification. They are also widely recognized as instigating the economic collapse and 
credit crunch of 2008.4  
Other effects were persistent enough to puzzle the supporters of the EMH, such as the 
January effect (Rozeff and Kinny 1976, Reinganum 1993). More recently, Jegadeesh (2012) has 
found evidence of predictability in individual stock returns by way of a significant first-order serial 
correlation in monthly returns. The most famous anomaly is probably the size effect. Keim (1983) 
found that in a very-long run (his study went back to 1926) smaller companies’ equity persistently 
generated larger returns than larger companies' did. (Fama and French (1993) found similar results 
in an analogous study.) The preferred solution, according to Fama and French, was that beta was 
perhaps not the best proxy for risk and that size could add some predictability to returns. (Malkiel 
(2003: 64) ventured that some sort of survival bias could be acting upon the data and that any 
abnormal returns from such strategies were only transient, but accepted Fama and French’s central 
conclusions). Seeing the problem as a lack of independent variables in the CAPM, Fama and French 
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 McKinnon (2013: chap. 5) views the crisis as predicated on destabilizing carry trade flows, with investors trying to 
take advantage of interest rate differentials. In the largest bust of the crisis, Iceland witnessed what appeared at the time 
to be healthy capital inflows throughout the 2000s which suddenly reversed in 2008 as the carry trade came to an end 
(Bagus and Howden 2011a).  
(1993) suggested a three-factor asset pricing model (including price-to-book-value and size as 
measures for risk) as the appropriate benchmarks against which anomalies should be measured. As 
cracks in the CAPM edifice started to be revealed, this became the preferred solution – multi-factor 
models to improve predictive power.5  
Paradoxically perhaps, this predictive power was not an affront to EMH. Rather it defined 
“predictability” within the context of the factors under study. Prices still followed a random walk to 
the extent that the influences on these factors could not be known in advance, and hence predicted.  
This paradox of predicating a model that predicts return based on expected risk (as in 
CAPM) on the random returns that EMH provides for poses a problem. Since the only way to test 
the EMH is by using an asset-pricing model, there is no way the hypothesis can be rejected 
(Cuthbertson and Nitzsche 1996; Campbell et al 1997: 24). “The definitional statement that in an 
efficient market prices 'fully reflect' available information is so general that it has no empirical 
testable implications” (Fama 1970: 384).6 In its place, the problem could be and generally is 
attributed to the failure of the model testing it, and not due to the hypothesis under examination. 
Lacking a valid asset-pricing model to test the hypothesis, EMH is not a testable proposition and 
cannot even be considered as tentatively true. Indeed, as Campbell et al. (1997: 24) conclude: 
 
[A]ny test of efficiency must assume an equilibrium model that defines normal security 
returns. If efficiency is rejected, this could be because the market is truly inefficient or 
because an incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed. This joint hypothesis problem 
means that market efficiency as such can never be rejected. 
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 These cracks continue to show, albeit under various guises. In testing the appropriateness of Fama and French’s 
preferred beta-augmenting factors of a firm’s market capitalization and book-to-market ratio, Griffin (2002) finds the 
coefficients to provide a better fit with country-specific data instead of cross-country analyses. In a more recent test of 
their original hypothesis, Fama and French (2012) found a similar agreement whereby local factors were more 
predictive than global ones. To improve on the deficiency of not thoroughly identifying the appropriate factors, other 
models with additional factors have been created. Carhart (1997) provides one such example which includes a 
momentum factor. However, none of these models fully accounts for the risk-return tradeoff in stock prices, nor 
explains certain anomalies of continual abnormal returns.  
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 While modern tests of EMH use some form of CAPM to gauge efficiency, Fama was not clear on what type of model 
would be necessary. As a result, later reports by Fama that an empirical test either confirmed EMH or was incorrect are 
unsubstantiated to the extent that outside of a model specified by EMH they are meaningless (Leroy 2004).
 
 This line of criticism levied against EMH is reminiscent of Grossman (1976) and Grossman and 
Stiglitz’ (1980) work on market efficiency. The reasoning in Campbell et al. (1997) boils down to 
the requirement of a functioning and accurate pricing model to test realized returns against. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) reckon that any level of informational efficiency must be gauged 
relative to the ability of the market to absorb new information. This ability to absorb information 
decreases as the level of information incorporated increases because of the increasing marginal cost 
of information gathering. Under this reasoning: 
 
In the limit, when there is no noise, prices convey all information, and there is no incentive 
to purchase information. Hence, the only equilibrium is one with no information. But, if 
everyone is uninformed, it clearly pays some individual to become informed. Thus there 
does not exist a competitive equilibrium. (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980: 395)  
 
One conclusion is that as long as there is a profit to offset the cost of gathering information the 
market could reach an equilibrium. Grossman and Stiglitz correctly observe that in order for 
information to reach the market someone must gather it, and identify that function as being 
performed by an entrepreneur (to collect a rent), which leads them to conclude that any equilibrium 
must be one which contains an “equilibrium degree of desequilibrium” (Grossman and Stiglitz 
1980: 393). One implication is that market efficiency will be determined by the costs of gathering 
and processing relevant information (Lo and MacKinlay 1999: 5-6) and that a fully efficient market 
will not incorporate all available information. 
 Yet this approach too runs into difficulties as an affront to EMH. There cannot be a 
premeditated search for information cognizant of its costs and benefits, because the entrepreneur in 
question does not know in advance what the benefits are (Huerta de Soto 2004; 2008). As a critique 
of EMH it commits the error of petitio principii. By assuming that one can assign a cost to 
information sought, one also rules out EMH at initiation. Since EMH states that prices move 
randomly lacking information as yet to occur that will affect them, it is also impossible that one 
could estimate a cost for this as yet unknown information. As such, any approach to disprove EMH 
must take a different line of attack that does not itself rely on the knowledge of future information 
relevant to price formation. 
 
Logical Contradictions  
For EMH to prevail, one of two assumptions concerning price formation must hold true: 
 
1. All relevant information must be interpreted by all market participants in the same way, or 
2. A sufficient critical mass of market participants must interpret relevant information in the 
same way. 
 
The first criterion seems too strict to describe most market functions. Price formation occurs under 
conditions where both sides of the trade – buyers and sellers – disagree about the price, either 
because they disagree about the relevance or because they disagree about the interpretation of the 
information at hand. In this way, EMH is an impossible standard because of a constraint placed on it 
by the market (Collier (2011). Thus  EMH  holds markets to an impossible standard under this 
reasoning, and that since price formation occurs through opposed interpretations of information, 
that at least one-half of the market must disagree with the importance of information at any given 
price. For price formation to occur, it must be that either: 1) sellers think that information is not 
important for the price, or that it has been incorrectly interpreted to overvalue the good at hand, or 
2) buyers think that information is important, or that it has yet to be fully incorporated into the 
good's price. Notice that due to differing interpretations of information, EMH cannot hold as prices 
are deemed incorrect or inefficient by half of participants. In the case dealing with the relevance of  
information, EMH would not hold because the market has yet to fully incorporate the information 
into prices.7 
 The second criterion falls prey to a similar criticism. Markets are informationally efficient if 
only a critical mass of participants factored the relevant information into prices previously. It must 
follow from this that either, 1) the other market participants excluded from this critical mass lack 
the necessary information, or 2) this other group of participants disagrees with the relevance or 
interpretation of information. The first case will almost certainly hold true, and in and of itself is not 
a serious affront to EMH as it cannot seriously impair price formation. The latter is a more serious 
objection, and is closely aligned with the reasoning we just gave to object to the first criterion.  
 The claim that a market is “efficient” if it fully incorporates all relevant information relies 
not only on the ability of the market to incorporate information but also on  the interpretation of 
such information. If one group agrees with the relevance and impact of new information, and they 
trade on such information accordingly, then it follows that the market may be informationally 
efficient from their point of view. This efficiency is unique to them, however, as it is itself defined 
as agreement concerning the impact of information which, by inclusion in the group, members must 
agree with. The group which has refrained from trading on such information (or, has formed the 
opposite side of the trade from the group acting on new information) must disagree with either its 
relevance or impact (or both). The market will appear inefficient to this latter group in the sense that 
information was incorporated that has pushed prices away from the values they deemed appropriate 
(efficient) given the information at hand. Efficient prices for one group requires inefficient prices in 
the eyes of the other. 
 There could be recourse to a situation where everyone agrees with the impact of new 
information and acts accordingly. Positive news in the market concerning a good would cause all 
participants to attempt to purchase the under-valued good and push its price higher to its efficiently 
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 Alternatively both sides could interpret the information identically, but differences in personal discount rates will 
invoke different actions. Consider two parties that believe the arrival of new information over the coming year will 
increase a share’s price from $10 to $11. If one’s discount rate is 9% he will be a net buyer, while if the other’s is 
11% he will be a net seller. We thank Rafael García Iborra for this insight.  
valued price. Yet since all units of a good must be owned by someone at any given time, it is not 
possible that everyone becomes a net purchaser simultaneously. If everyone's price assessment 
increases simultaneously, the price could only increase if  some people sold upon higher offers. Yet 
the price could never get to its “informationally efficient” value if EMH held, as no one would sell 
at a price below the expected one (in which cash no one would want to be a net buyer). 
Until recently (e.g., Coolier 2011) this constraint went rather unnoticed most likely because, 
in the real world, buyers and sellers, in theory, do not have to disagree about the relevance or 
importance of information in order to trade (although it is also very unlikely, not to say impossible 
that two individuals might actually possess the exact same information). This could happen either 
because they have differing ends or consider distinct time horizons and subsequent discount rates 
when making investment decisions. Yet, under the assumptions of the EMH and the tests performed 
to verify the hypothesis all investors share the same goal (e.g., to outperform the market) and time is 
either not considered or assumed to be equivalent for all, generally equivalent to the time-frame of 
the sample being tested. 
 This general flaw in the reasoning behind EMH can be summarized as a deficiency in the 
choice of relevant assumptions, leaving the subsequent theory with a logically coherent structure 
within only the narrow confines of its assumptions. Unfortunately, “the features typically omitted 
[by a model] are the very features that are crucial to understand how the market functions” (Long 
2006: 3-4). Long treats this as a general problem plaguing economic modeling, and EMH is a case 
in point. By treating market participants as a homogenous group – in terms of their valuations and 
expectations – it achieves a definition of efficiency unable to obtain in reality. At the same time it 
adds nearly nothing to our understanding of that same reality  
 Other important assumptions behind the hypothesis fair no better. If the assumptions that 
price changes are independent and that there is a distribution function for those prices were not 
relevant, they should have not been specified to start with.8 
 Price changes create information, in the sense that as relative valuations between goods 
change market participants must alter their consumption and production activities to maintain 
utility. Any price change, as a result, cannot be independent of another as a feedback effect will alter 
the existing price constellation. As any price change creates information in and of itself, subsequent 
price changes (in its own price or that of other goods) cannot be independent.9 As any future price 
change will rely on a potentially uncertain (and unknowable) event, even if these price changes are 
random they will not be probabilistically so. And if no probability distribution can be identified to 
govern these price changes, then probability theory is useless in estimating future prices. As a result, 
future price changes could be moving randomly (something EMH adherents would find comfort in), 
though they would not necessarily be moving independently of other prices and would not be 
according to any price distribution. This latter statement is a direct contradiction to EMH and 
related work, and also negates  the use of probability theory in analyzing and providing estimates of 
future price movements.  
 One deficiency in the EMH framework is the confusion between prices as embodied 
information, and prices as being information. For active market participants – whether buyers or 
sellers – prices are summary statistics of their assessment of information on the market. Most 
commonly, as summary statistics these prices represent information concerning not only supply and 
demand conditions but also the market participant's expectations concerning the future (Hayek 
1945). Yet for those not intimately involved with the pricing process, that is to say anyone who is 
not actively buying or selling the good in question, the price becomes a piece of information in and 
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 Theory should be weary of undue assumptions that needlessly pigeonhole the item under examination (Khun 1962). 
Alternatively, the assumptions should not be in contradiction to reality as any success of the resultant theory could only 
be accidental.  
9
 Bagus and Howden (2012: 274fn7) outline the lack of attention to relative price adjustments as endemic in much 
economic modeling due to the emphasis placed on two-good models. Since there is only one relative output price to 
equilibrate, relative price effects are eliminated. As a consequence the complexity and interrelationships between 
multiple goods through their prices is often overlooked.  
of itself. While it is simple to think of these two groups as being concerned with the same thing, 
there is a distinction.  
 For participants actively engaged in the pricing process, the price that results from their 
actions is important to them only in the sense that it informs them of how close they are to their 
ultimate goal. Since the price itself is a summary of past actions by buyers and sellers, it can convey 
no information concerning the future state of affairs. It is this expected future state of affairs that 
active participants are buying or selling to meet, in a bid to move prices to their own subjective 
assessment of what the future holds. In this sense, buyers and sellers are more concerned with 
meeting unmet supplies or demands by monitoring for deficiencies or surpluses in the quantities of 
goods traded on the market, and not directly with the prices that these goods are trading at 
(Hülsmann 1997; Bagus and Howden 2011b: section 5).    
 For those participants not directly involved in the pricing process, the price becomes a 
summary of the past information concerning the good. The price is a form of information for this 
group, and represents the subjective assessments of those active market participants made objective 
through the embodiment of the price. These participants not involved in price setting may have no 
knowledge of any of the underlying information concerning the good or its value, though they will 
have an objective summary of these reckonings via a simple price.  
 Note that from a market efficiency standpoint only one of these groups will consider prices 
to be accurate and complete summaries of the available information. The group of active 
participants – those transacting on information revealed through the market – are doing so precisely 
because the market is not efficient. At least, it is not efficient according to their own valuation 
assessment. Through their actions, they move prices to more closely align with the values they 
deem to be more in accordance with their interpretation of the information. As long as active buyers 
and sellers are altering the price of a good, that price will forever be informationally inefficient. 
Inefficiency in this case would be by lack of consensus concerning the true relevance for revealed 
information on price formation. With this line of reasoning, we can find much agreement with 
Mises’ (1949: 338) emphasis on “false prices” as existing in the eyes of individuals who are 
undertaking any purchase or sale decision at any moment in time. 
 Passive observers of price formation will, however, be in general agreement that the market 
is in a state of informational efficiency. If they didn't believe that prices already fully and accurately 
summarized revealed information they would actively trade on such knowledge to better align 
prices with their valuations.  
 Perhaps this bifurcation boils down to the distinction between objectively given information 
and subjectively derived knowledge. In this sense, information is that body of facts in existence at 
any given time, e.g., the color we refer to as black is defined as the absence of color, Mariano Rajoy 
is the president of Spain in 2013, or water at sea level freezes at zero degrees centigrade. While 
these informational facts are mostly trivial, their relevance and potential impact on prices will 
change depending on the individual and the complex of additional information at his disposal. This 
additional information specific to the individual makes the sum of information known to him highly 
subjective, and we may distinguish it from its objective source by referring to it as knowledge 
(Thomsen 1992). To the active market participant, information revealed through the market is 
subjectively valued and traded on if relevant. The market could not, by this standard, be in a state of 
informational efficiency because each body of information known by an individual will be distinct 
and valued distinctly. All prices being acted on by this group will be considered inefficient from an 
informational standpoint. EMH, to the extent that it describes any set of individuals, can only 
describe those individuals who act as passive receivers of information through prices, and who must 
deem them to be already in a state of informational efficiency as evidenced by their inaction in light 
of the new information. But it cannot then explain how markets (that is, investors) act to reach such 
a state. 
 Some advocates of EMH may object to this characterization of markets as inefficient for 
those who are actively engaged in the price formation process, and could respond by saying that 
investors believe that the market is inefficient while it is not. The objection is a serious threat to the 
assumptions of the model so Malkiel, for example, allows for some degree of short-run inefficiency 
that must eventually give way, stating that “the stock-market, in the short run may be a voting 
mechanism, in the long run is a weighing mechanism, true value will win out in the end” (2003: 
61).  
 Yet what would make one think that the long run should behave any differently than the here 
and now? Unless there is a definite “Judgment Day” in the market, there will forever be a state of 
overlapping short runs grasping for that fabled end. Indeed, thinking that prices will converge in the 
long run to their informationally efficient state begs the question. Any long run is defined as that 
state where variables have fully adjusted to revealed information. Since EMH is defined as any 
market where prices fully reflect all information, this must by definition coincide with any market 
in its long-run equilibrium. To state that “true value”, or correctly and fully incorporated 
information will bring long-run prices to their informationally efficient level is to assume what has 
to be proven. The question is really one of why any short-run price would be informationally 
efficient, which could only be the case if no one was incentivized to act upon it.  
 Under this rationale, EMH becomes a long-run hypothesis. It can define that state of affairs 
that would conceivably prevail if new information ceased and an equilibrium emerged. Yet as a 
theory aimed at describing the pricing process, this only opens the Hypothesis to deeper questions.10 
 While describing an equilibrium state with full information incorporation already achieved, 
EMH leaves no explicit room for an entrepreneur (or even a Walrasian auctioneer, for that matter).  
If an individual can be shown to have correctly forecast prices, the EMH explicitly states this event 
will not disprove the hypothesis but is something that, given the assumptions, has to be accepted. 
When coupled with the CAPM, a series of prices obtain which should exist given the constraints 
considered (e.g., liquidity available, risk-free interest rates, and a given risk correlation between 
assets). These two theories taken together are reckoned to yield “correct” risk-adjusted prices and 
should be a better estimator of value than individuals.  
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 As an equilibrium state the EMH is less than satisfactory (Howden 2009). While assuming away those data that it is 
seeking to explain, the EMH leaves one with little understanding of what factors influence price formation which is, 
after all, the heart of the phenomenon under examination. 
 Yet there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that some degree of price estimation is possible. 
Investors who have obtained above average risk-adjusted rates of return for extended periods of 
time (e.g., George Soros or Warren Buffett) can only be accounted by EMH by one of three 
explanations: 1) either their abnormal returns must be “normal” returns that other investors should 
be tending towards, 2) the asset-pricing model used to generate the expected returns must be 
deficient, or 3) the magnitude of investors is so large that, applying the law of large numbers, it is 
possible for one individual to have a track record that consistently beats the market while investors 
on average will not.11 
 In none of these explanations is there room to incorporate an individual (we may call him 
the entrepreneur) exercising good judgment or foresight (Pasour 1989; Shostak 1997). Indeed, good 
entrepreneurs can be found in either arbitraging away market mispricings (Kirzner 1973) or 
discovering new elements relevant for the market's future advance (Mises 1949). Both of these 
entrepreneurial roles are excluded in the EMH framework. The Kirznerian entrepreneur explicitly 
cannot exist in the EMH world as no mispricings can exist by definition. The Misesian entrepreneur 
could be thought of as the one who unearths new relevant information and incorporates it into the 
price constellation, though this belief can only be partially admitted by the EMH in its weak form. 
Since EMH states that no future information can be rationally unearthed in advance – it must be 
unknown as, if it was, its importance would already be priced in – any semblance of rationality on 
behalf of the entrepreneur must be eschewed. In its place, any new information must be accidentally 
uncovered and acted on, with little cognizance as to where it came from or what its importance is in 
regards to the good in question. 
 This final statement may be an assumption useful in developing the Hypothesis, but it takes 
the Hypothesis one step further from that which it seeks to explain. Market participants are actively 
searching for, uncovering and incorporating new information into the array of existing prices. That 
they are not randomly searching for information, nor is random information the only influence on 
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 Bear in mind that over time the average performance of all participants is the average (ex-post expected) return of the 
market, so this argument cannot be falsified. 
existing prices, suggests that markets are neither informationally efficient nor following a random 
walk in price formation.12 Alternatively, the existence of two sides to any transaction – a buyer and 
a seller – suggests that informational efficiency cannot obtain in the sense that there is continual 
disagreement as to the correctness of current prices, as well as the relevance of new information.  
 
A new path for efficiency 
The market is not efficient because it contains all relevant information in a more or fully-complete 
manner, but because it allows individuals to act in a socially coordinated way. It is not that market 
prices gather all existing information, it is that individuals acting in those markets strive to do so 
and pay the cost if they are wrong.  
 If EMH is to be called into question today, the starting point should not be that markets or 
investors are irrational (as in Farmer et al. 2012).13 Likewise, holding actual market returns to a 
standard set by a pricing model assuming a hyper-rationality applying to all individuals (as in 
CAPM) also seems misplaced.  A more fruitful approach is to accept that investors are rational 
within the confines of their knowledge, and that this has not changed over time (Statman 2005).  
When market returns shift dramatically and seem to affront the EMH fortress, it is neither the 
standard of efficiency nor the reputation of a market which is at stake, but rather the claim that 
markets are informationally efficient. Likewise, criticizing the EMH on the basis of asset price 
volatility is conceptually wrong, as efficiency says little about volatility and is instead concerned 
with the concepts of rationality and information (Szafarz 2009). Instead, the hypothesis part of the 
EMH is better described as a conjecture. 
 
                                               
12
 Paradoxically, this result most closely obtains through the artificial fostering of insider trading laws on the market. By 
barring those intimately aware of the creation and importance of information (insiders) from trading on such 
information, it is up to outsiders to incorporate its importance into the price. Since outsiders have less knowledge 
concerning the relevance of information than insiders, prices will tend to be less informationally efficient as a result 
(Howden forthcoming). Efficient in this sense would imply that information is not only fully incorporated into the price 
array but also rationally so, so as to foster correct prices given the facts at hand. 
 
13
 A more extreme view can be found in blaming the EMH for causing the crisis (Fox 2009). 
Conclusion 
Although it makes a seemingly innocuous claim only about the informational efficiency of prices, 
the efficient market hypothesis is plagued with difficulties. Some of these problems lie in the logic 
behind its construction. Others are a result of the standard by which the efficacy of its claim can be 
measured. In this paper we have shed light on both of these aspects. 
 Any market with active price formation occurring will shield itself from any definition of 
efficiency by way of the diametrically opposed viewpoints of the participants. Those who are 
actively trading on new information are doing so because they feel the current prices are inefficient 
– inefficient in the sense that they do not contain all relevant information, or have disseminated it in 
an incorrect manner. Only those participants who are passive observers of the pricing process may 
be said to believe that prices are informationally efficient, as if they thought otherwise they would 
be actively trading to align them with their estimated values and thus realize a profit opportunity. 
 Attempts to test the validity of the EMH are mostly misplaced as they define an abnormal 
return in terms of some other pricing model, commonly the capital asset pricing model. This testing 
procedure is misplaced as it relies on a model that is itself predicated on EMH. It furthermore 
suffers the deficiency that the correct price is what is tested for, and not the fullness of informational 
dissemination throughout the price complex. Since EMH only makes a claim about informational 
efficiency, and this is unable to be tested for directly, the Hypothesis does not lend itself to 
empirical verification. 
 In light of the theoretical deficiencies we outline in this paper, EMH is better referred to as a 
conjecture. Indeed, in the early stages of its development it was identified as a theory in search of 
evidence. The fact that the theory is still so widely disputed nearly 50 years after its original 
exposition, and that ambiguous tests of its relevance plague the literature, bring doubts to those who 
see the EMH as intuitively flawed. 
 As a conjecture the EMH is misplaced. Logical inconsistencies internal to its formulation 
cast doubt that it could hold in isolated settings (such as a long-run equilibrium). The crisis has led 
to a rethinking as to how best to label EMH, with some claiming that it is really the inefficient 
markets hypothesis. Rather than recast the Hypothesis in terms of redefining how the market 
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